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"THE COURT: It begs the question which is this: DOt.'8
your established rule of conduct not operate by way of an
admission as to what is necessary in the way of safe street
maintenance, and when you say it is not and therefore it
does not prove anything, you come around in a circle. Does
not the city's adoption and pursuit of that standard of conduct
operate by way of admission as to what is reasonably necessary
and proper to the end of safety I
"(Further discussion omitted.)
"TBB COURT: If I understand tou correctly, it is now
stipulated that aside from the testimony of Mr. Kincaid and
Mr. Fell, the plaintiff has no further evidence to oJfer in
chief, and it is stipulated that the defendant may and will go
forward forthwith with the proof of its ease and without
prejudice to the making of any motion for non-suit if so
advised when the plaintiff shall have finally rested' Is that
correct I
"MR. O'CONNOR: Yes.
"Ma. HAYES:- Yes.I I (.rury resumes their plaee in the jury box.)"
At the close of plaintiff's case, the following appears in th('
record:
"Ma.. O'CoNNOR: That is all.
"With the stipulation plaintiff will rest, with the stipulation that we have.
"TBB COURT: Do you want that read nowl
"Ma. O'CONNOR: I would appreciate it, your Honor.
"TBB COURT: Counsel for defendant adequately stnft'd
into the record such objections as you had to the stipulated
facts I
"Ma. HAn:s: Well, I had better restate my position at
this time. First, that the contents <d the proposed stipulat.ion
with reference to the repairs of the damages as to sidewalks,
are merely instructions to workmen, giving them some idea as
to what types of holes, what to look for to indicate if sidewalks are beginning to deteriorate. They are not a set of rules
or standards. Second, that the superintendent of streets has
no authority to adopt a set of rules which would give, as a
standard for any imposition or determination of the liability
of the City, what holes mayor may not be dangerous or
defective. Third, that the City of Long Beach has the right
-Defendant contrasts the plain showing iD the record ot ita assent
·to this stipuL'ltion with the absence ot all)" evidence of ita aasoat to
the .tipulatiOll dictated iDto the rveord b1 the trial court.
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to give instructions to its men to take preventive measures
for the repair of its sidewalks which may be, or at a later
date become, defective without determining that the hole eonstitutes dangerous or defective conditions or that there is
anything about the hole at the time that the repair is made
that it is a dangerous or defective condition.
e e May I mix argument with objections' On the further
ground it is incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial and does
not tend to prove any of the issues in this case. It doesn't
tend to prove this particular spot or any other particular
spot in the City of Long Beach was in a dangerous or defective
condition, ealls for a conclusion on the part of Mr. Kincaid
or the parties who make the repairs. That states my position
as well as the objections.
"To Col1B'r: The objection is overruled.
"Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, from time to time
throughout the case you have heard counsel stipulate that certain things might be done or certain things were true. While
statements of counsel ordinarily are to be taken merely as argument or objection and not evidence, when they stipulate to a
fact or facts, that establishes those facts for the purposes
bf the case. Last night in your absence counsel for the respective parties did make a stipulation concerning certain facts,
which stipulation will now be read to you by the reporter."
At this point the court reporter read the stipulation to the
jury.
Defend~t '. objection to the stipulation dictated into the
record by the trial court is directed at the statement therein
that "the City had a<\opted and did pursue, as a standard
of conduct with respect to the maintenance and repair of its
streets the following rule. • • ." Defendant concedes that
counsel for the city was willing to stipulate that Mr. Kincaid,
the superintendent of streets, if c81led as a witness for plaintift would testify that he had given certain instructions to
his workmen with reference to the maintenance and repair
of the streets, but contends that counsel for defendant was
unwilling to concede, and did not assent to the trial court's
assumption that these instructions constituted a "standard
of conduct" adopted and pursued by the city.
[3] Unless the trial court, in its discretion, permits a party
to withdraw from a stipulation {see 23 Cal.Jur. § 14, p. 829;
161 A.L.R. 1161, note; 60 C.J., § 98, p. 91; 9 Wigmore on
Evidence (3d ed.), § 2G90, p. 588), it is conclusive upon the
parties, and the truth of the facts contained therein cannot

)
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ht' eontradicted. (Woodward v.Bro'UJ'n, 119 Cal. 283, 295 [51
P. 2, 542, 63 Am.St.Rep. 108] ; Haese v. Heitzeg, 15!? Cal. 569.
575 [114 P. 816] ; see 23Cal.Jur., § 12, p. 826; 2 Jones, Commentaries on Evidence, § 257, p. 454.) Hence, if the parties
assented to the stipulation in question, defendant cannot now
contend that a "standard of conduct" was not adopted by
the city with respect to the maintenance and repair of its
streets.
. [4] A stipulation is an agreement between cou,nsel respecting business before the court (Bouv. Law Diet., Baldwin's
Century Edition), and like any other agreement or contract,
it is essential that the parties or their counsel agree to its
terms. (See, Back v. Farmworth, 25 Cal.App.2d 212, 219-220
[77 P.2d 295]; 23 Cal.Jur. § 9, p. 822; Civ. Code, §§ 1550,
1565; 60 C.J. § 3, p. 40.) As provided in section 283 of the
Code of Civil Procedure: "An attorney and counselor shall
have authority: 1. To bind his client in any of the steps
of an action or proceeding by his agreement filed with the
clerk, or entered upon the minutes of the court, and not
otherwise; . . ." [5] While it is true that in the instant
case, the purported stipulation was entered in the minutes
immediately after consultation between court and counsel (see,
Borkkeim v. North British If M. Ins. Co., 38 Cal. 623, 628),
there is no evidence that defendant ever agreed to the stipulation as worded either at the time the consultation took place
or at the time the stipulation was dictated into the record.
Had defendant's counsel remained silent after dictation of
this stipulation, his passive acquiescence would constitute
assent. (Low Estate Co; v. Lederer Realty Co., 39 R.I. 422,
429 [98 A. 180]. See also,Ward v. Goetz, 33 Cal.App. 595,
597 [165 P. 1022]; Wilson v. Mattei, 84 Cal.App: 567, 571
[258 P. 453].) He did not remain silent, however, but
immediately following the court's dictation, objected to the
admissibility of the stipulation and argued that no "standard
of conduct" had been adopted by the city, and that what.
the court termed a "standard of conduct" merely consisted
of instructions given to workmen by the Superintendent of
Streets. The argument between the court and defendant's
coun.<rel shows clearly that the court was dictating into the
record over the protestations of defendant's counsel, the
court's own version of the facts and the court's own conclusion that the superintendent's instructions to workmen constituted a "standard of conduct" adopted by the city.

)
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In the absence of evidence that defendant consented to the
stipulaiion, it can hardly be maintained that there was an
"agreement ... entered upon the minutes of the court" as
contemplated by the foregoing section of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Entry of the purported st.ipulation in the minutes
upon request of plaintiff's counsel did not bind defendant
!lince "it was not in the power of the Court, nor anyone eIRe,
without [defendant's] consent, or that of [its] attorney. to
make it binding." (Bork1t.Bim v. North British ct M. 1m. Co.,
supra, 38 Cal. 623, 628.)
[6] It is contended, however, that since the record is
silent as to what occurred between the court and counsel at the
bench before the court dictated the stipulation, it must be
assumed that the parties agreed to it at that time and that
defendant was thereafter simply objecting to its admissi.bility
in evidence. The only recital in the record from which it could
be assumed that defendant assented to the stipulation is the
court's statement to the jury that "Last ni~ht in your absence
counsel for the respective parties did make a stipUlation
which stipulation will now be read to you by the reporter."
This statement, implying as it does that defendant assented
,to the stipulation as worded, is not supported by the record
and is therefore not conclusive on this issue. (See, Sheppard
v. Sheppard, 15 Cal.App. 614, 618-619 [115 P. 7G1].) Counsel
for defendant objected not only to the evidentiary use of the
stipulation but also interposed a specific objection "that the
contents of the proposed stipulation with reference to the
repairs of the damages as to sidewalks, are merely instructions to workmen, giving them some idea as to what type of
holes, what to look for to indicate if sidewalks are bcginning
to deteriorate. They: .arellot a set of rules or standards." In
the light of this objection and the I argnment between the
court an!! defendant's counsel regarding the terms and effect
of the purported stipulation, it is not rCllSonable to as.<mme
that counsel for defendant had previously agreed to the
stipulation and was thereafter simply objecting to its admissibility in evidence. [7] Unless it is clear from the record
that both parties assented, there is no stipulation. (Borkheim
v. North British &7 M. Ins. Co., supra, 38 Cal. 623.) This rule
is particularly pertinent when, as here, the purported stipllln, tion gave up the basic defense upon which defendant relied,
',namely, that it violated no rea.<lOnable standard of conduct
'when
it failed to repair the defect in question. (See, P"esno
....
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City High School Did. v. DiU07&, 34 Cal.,App.2d 636, 647 [94
P.2d 86].)
In view of an attorney's duti to his client it should not
lightly be assumed that he stipulated away his case. Certainly,
defendant's willingness to stipulate that Mr. Kincaid would
give certain testimony if called as a witness does not justify
committing defendant to the trial court's views of the legal
significance of that testimony in the absence of evidence that
defendant agreed thereto. [8] StipUlations must be given
a' reasonable construction with a view to giving effect to the
intent of the parties and "the language used will not be so
construed as to give it the effect of an admission of a fact
ob,,·j.>usly ffitended to be controverted, or the waiver of a right
not plainly intended to be relinquished, . . . " (HuegeZ v.
Huegel, 329 Mo. 571, 576 [46 S.W.2d 157], quoting from 36
Cyc. 1291, 1292. See also, Seale v. Ford, 29 Cal. 104, 108;
City of San JOS6 v. Uridias, 37 Cal. 339, 345-346; OfT v.
Forde, 101 Cal.,App. 694, 699 [282 P. 429] ; Back v. Darnsworth, 25 Cal.App.2d 212, 220 [77 P.2d 295]; 23 Cal.Jur.,
§ 11, p. 824; 50 Am.Jur. 609.) .As stated by the court in
Theatrical Enterprise8, Inc. v. De,.r07&, 119 Cal.App. 671,
676 [7 P.2d 351] : "It may be conceded that stipulations of
fact, where no real controversy of fact appears, should be
encouraged, and when entered into, should be strictly enforced.
But there should be no sacrifice of substantial rights merely
to subserve the constant importuning to speed up trials. The
purpose of every trial is to examine into disputed facts. . • •
Stipulations are ordinarily entered into for the purpose of
avoiding delay, trouble or expense. .As a general rule they
should receive a fair and liberal construction, in harmony
with the apparent intention of the parties and the spirit
of justice, and in furtherance of fair trials upon the, merits,
rather than a narrow and technical one, calculated to defeat
the purposes of their execution. (25 R.C.L. 1095.)"
[9] Since there is no evidence that defendant ever agreed
to the stipUlation, the trial court erred in admitting it in
evidence and in causing it to be read to the jury over the
objections of defendant's counsel.
'fhis error was prejudicial to the rights of defendant and
necessitates reversing the judgment. The stipulation dictated
by the trial court related not simply to the facts but to the
legal significance of certain facta and bore directly on the
ba.'!ic issue whether the defect in question was dangerous and
whether the city in the exercise of reasonable care should have

)
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known about it and repaired it. It was for the jury to
formulate the standard by which to determine whether the
defect in question was dangerous within the meaning of the
Public Liability Act. (Balkwill v. City of Stockton, supra, 50
Cal.App.2d 661, 667.) The phrase "that the City had adopted
and did pursue, as a standard of conduct" carried the clear
connotation that the city's own standard of a dangerous
defect was a defect of a depth of one-half inch or more and
that the city regarded the repair of such defects as reasonably necessary for the safe maintenance of its sidewalks.
That the trial judge himself so understood the stipulation, is
clear from his argument with counsel, for it was because of
this very understanding that he ruled that the stipulation was
admissible. Since the city did uot enter into the stipulation
as worded, it was prejudicial error for the trial court to
dictate it into the record as evidence in the case, for the jury
was then free to adopt as their own standard of a dangerous
defect the very standard that the city purportedly adopted.
The evidence established without conflict that the hole
exceeded one-half inch in depth. Therefore, if defendant
entered into the stipulation, it thereby admitted its own negligence in failing to repair the hole. As stated by the trial
eourt, the adoption and pursuit of the" standard of conduct"
recited in the stipulation was an "admission on the part of
the defendant as to what was reasonably necessary for the safe
maintenance of the street." Since the other elements of plaintiff's cause of action were clearly proved, upon proof of
defendant's negligence by its own admission, its liability
under the Public Liability Act would necessarily follow.
The effect of the stipulation was; therefore, to remove from
dispute the very issues upon which the city's liability depended,
namely, whether the defect causing plaintiff's fall was dangerous within the meaning of the Public Liability Act, and
whether the city, in the exercise of reasonable care, was under
a duty to repair it. Its admission in evidence over the objections of counsel for defendant prevented a fair trial on the
merits.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J.,
eoncurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The majority of this court l'eVf'r!les a judgment for plaintiff for personal injuries Hulrcrcu as the result of a dangerous
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and defective condition of defendant city's street solely upon
the ground that a stipulation was improperly admitted in
eyidence, or perhaps more accurately stated, that a purported
stipulation was not such because it was not agreed to by defendant. The basic fallacy in that holding is that the record
shows that defendant did agree to (or it must be assumed it
did) the facts contained in the stipulation, and its only
objection or lack of assent was to the admiss,oility in evidence
of those facts; or in other words that the facts stated in the
stipulation were not admissible in evidence.
It will be noted from the majority opinion that the stipulation had to do with matters within the knowledge of James
Kincaid, the city superintendent of streets, namely, the instructions, rules or practice of the city with regard to the
repair of all defects in the streets of over one-half inch in
depth. The first place in the record that Kincaid comes into
the picture is near the close of plaintiff's case. Plaintiff's
counsel stated that he would like to "call" Kincaid to the witness stand. To the court's inquiry of whether he was present
there was no response. In view of that state of affairs plaintiff's counsel stated that he wanted "to call a man [clearly
referring to Kincaid] whose duty it was to inspect any repairing of the sidewalk." To the court's query of whether he had
another witness he could "put on" at that time (that is, that
such was necessary for Kincaid was not present), plaintiff
answered in the affirmative and called another witness to the
stand. After that witness testified the record is silent aff to
what occurred. It merely appears that counsel was called
to the bench out of the hearing of the jury and the courtwith-,
out ado recited the stipulation. 'Clearly there must have been
a preliminary discussion between coUllBel and the court, and
in the absence of the nature thereof we must assume that it
followed the usual and ordinary course, that is, that there was
no necessity of calling Kincaid as a witness for there was no
dispute as to what his testimony would be with reference to
the practice or rule of the city in regard to repairing its streets ;
the only question would be the admissibility of his testimony.
Not only should wc make that assumption but it is borne out
by the previou~ unavailing calling of Kincaid, defendant's
fa:lure to cn.Il Kincp.id to testify differently, and the jury instruction ofierco by defendant to the effect that the fact the
city "may have adopted a standard of conduct with regard
to ddects ill sidcwaU:s which shnhld be repa:r<>d, is not to be
taken as evidence by you that said defects necessarily consti-
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the location of such defects. " 'l'he instruction ell'arly indicates
defendant's assumption that while the facts of the existence
of the rule were true, yet it docs not necessarily show a dangl)rous condition. That is undoubtedly the law, and it shows that
the only thing with which defendant was concerned war; the
admissibility of such a rule in evidence. It had been held
admissible over its objection and it desired to have the true
character of its value as evidence explained to the jury.
The objections to the stiPlllation both at the time it was
stated by the court out of the presence of the jury and whf'n
it was read to them by the reporter, went only to the admissibility of the rule, not the fact of its existence. At first defendant's counsel stated that he objected "to the introduction of
any evidence on the ground that it is incompetent, irrelevant
and immaterial and doesn't tend to show whether or not this
was a dangerous or defective condition; is merely a standard
set np to prevent further deterioration of the street and was
not t~ be taken as an indication in any manner that we believed
it to be a dangerous or defective condition, but was merely a
precautionary measure that has nothing to do under the law
to set up any standard other than is defined in the law itself.
It does not prove or disprove any of the issues involved in
this case." All of the foregoing argument goes solely to the
issue of whether the rule was for the purpose of preventing
a deterioration of the streets or for the safety of pedestrians.

That was a pure le[]al question relating to its admissibility.
On its face the rule does not purport to be limited to preser,;'~'
vation of the streets. It was broad enough to embrace both
purposes. If counsel believed that the rule was so limited it
was incumbent on him to establish that claim. All the objections of coun.'lel to the stipulation are along the same line.
None of them questions the existence of the rule. 'l'hey are
Solely concerned with its purpose and on that basis alone the
claim of inadmissibility is made. Certainly it is manifest that
the trial court and opposing counsel understood defendant'8
objection as being no more comprehensive than that the (!vidence was not admissible. If plaintiff's counsel had nnt been
80 misled he could have called Kincaid and had him testify.
On the issue of the admissibility of the rule, the majority
k opinion has nothing to say. It was undoubtedly admissible
f, and I am satisfied with the following dis~ussion and authori-

t,ties presented on that subject in the doomon by the Distri••
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Court of Appeal in this case (83 A.C.A. li82 at lIP. 590-592
[189 P.2d 62~ ): "Evidence may be given upon a trial of the
act, declaration or omission of a party. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1870, subd. 2.) Any fact is admissible in evidence from
which the facts in issue are logically inferable. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1870, subd. 15.) It is an elemental rule of evidence
that the statements or conduct of a party tending to refute
his position are admissible. Mr. Justice Holmes, in Texas P. B.
Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468 [23 S.Ct. 622. 47 L.Ed. 905J.
said that: 'What usually is done may be evidence of what
ought to be done. but what ought to be done is fixed by a
standard of reasonable prudence, whether it is usually complied with or not.' Mr. Wigmore says that, 'the regulations
adopted by an employer for the conduct of a factory or a
transportation system, may be some evidence of his belief as
to· the standard of care required, and thus of the negligent
nature of an act violating those rules.' (2 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed.) § 282, p. 132.) Shearman and Redfield say that,
'It has been said that" a violation of rules previously adopted
by a defendant in reference to the safety of third persons has
generally been admitted in evidence as tending to show negligence of the defendant's disobedient servant for which the
defendant is liable," , citing King v. Interborough B. T. Co.,
233 N.Y. 330, 333 [135 N.E. 519]. (3 Shearman and Redfield
on Negligence, § 506, p. 1281.)
"Evidence of a custom of a defendant and its violation is
held admissible as some evidence of negligence. Scott v. Gallot,
59 Cal.App.2d 421 [138 P.2d 685], was an action arising out
of alleged negligence of the defendant. It was held that a
motion for a new trial was properly granted because the court
had erroneously stricken evidence introduced by the plaintiff
of a custom of the defendant which it had violated. (See,
also, Thomas v. Southern Pacific Co., 116 Cal.App. 126, 131
[2 P.2d 544] ; Mace v. Watanabe, 31 Cal.App.2d 321, 323 [87
P.2d 893]; Burke v. John E. Marshall, Inc., 42 Cal.App.2d
195, 203 [108 P.2d 738].)
•• An ordinance of a municipality prescribing rules and
regulations for the conduct of its employees is admissible in
evidence as an act or declaration of a party concerning a matter involved in the suit. (Jordan v. City of Lexington, 133
Miss. 440 [97 So. 758] ; Hebenheimer v. City of St. Louis, 269
Mo. 92 [189 S.W. 1180] ; McLeod v. City of Spokane, 26 Wash.
346 [67 P. 74] ; City of Indianapolis v. Gaston, 58 Ind. 224;
Smith v. City oj Pella, 86 Iowa 236 [53 N.W. 226].)
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"We are dealing here with rules and regulations of the
party itself. They are admissible, as they are virtually admissions, in the language of the trial judge, •as to what was
reasonably necessary for the safe maintenance of the street.'
(2 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed.) § 462, p. 501.)
"Appellant engages in an extended argument and citation
of cases from other jurisdictions to the effect that rules and
regulations of a railroad company for the conduct of its servants in the operation of its trains should not be admitted in
evidence in this state. It says that even if such rules should
be held admissible the principle should not be extended to rules
and regulations of a municipal corporation for the conduct of
its servant in the maintenance of its streets. Counsel apparently overlooked the recent case of Simon v. Oity and Oounty
of San Francisco, 79 Cal.App.2d 590 [180 P.2d 393], where
the comt stated (pp. 597, 598); 'Defendants argue that the
rules of a carrier are not admissible and may not be considered on the issue of a carrier's negligence where the injured
party has no knowledge of the rules and did not rely upon
them. That was undoubtedly the rule announced in Smellie v.
Southern Pac. 00., 128 Cal.App. 567 [18 P.2d 97], by the
District Court of Appeal, but, the Supreme Court, in denying
a hearing in that case added the following comment (p. 583) :
"Such denial, however, shall not be construed as an approval
by this court of that portion of the opinion of the District
Court of Appeal which holds that admission of evidence of
the rules adopted by the defendant for the government of its
business was incompetent and prejudicial." In thus qualifying the appellate court opinion the Supreme Court undoubtedly had in mind its earlier decision in Geft v. Pacific Gas & Elec.
00., 192 Cal. 621 [221 P. 376J. In that case, the court, after
referring to the action of the motorman of defendant's street·
car in suddenly stopping his car in such manner as to blockade
a cross-street stated (p. 625): " ... his act in so doing was in
violation of an operating rule of the defendant, forbidding its
employees to stop the cars so as to block cross-streets or crosswalks. The existence of this rule, of course, did not render its
violation by defendant's employees negligence per se, but it
. was a circumstance proper to be considered by the jury in
~ J determining whether or not they were negligent."
"'In the more recent case of Nelson v. Southern Pacific 00.,
, .'
~"
8 Ca1.2d 648 [67 P .2d 682], the Supreme Court negatively
L" reaffirmed the doctrine of the Gett case in the following lan(p. 654), "It ••nnot be said that the exdusio. of tho

t_.
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respondent's time table was erroneous. While the rules of
operation are admissible (Oett v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co .• 192
Cal. 621 [221 P. 376], ... ), we fail to see the materiality of
the time table to the situation under scrutiny.". It follows
that the rules were admissible and that it was a question of
fact for the jury and not a question of law for the court to
determine whether the conduct of the motorman, under the
circumstances, constituted negligence. ' (See 3 Shearman and
Redfield on Negligence, § 481, p. 1202) ; Chicago & A. By. Co.
v. Eaton, 194 Ill. 441 [62 N.E. 784, 88 Am.St.Rep. 161] ; Stevens v. Boston Elevated By. Co., 184 Mass. 476 [69 N.E. 338] ;
Bilodeau v. F'itchberg &- L. St. By. Co., 236 Mass. 526 [128
N.E. 872]; McNeil v. New York, N. H. & H. B. Co., 282 Mass.
575 [185 N.E. 471].)"
Finally, even assuming it was error to admit the stipulation it was not prejudicial. The jury was fully instructed
upon the correct standard with reference to defects in streets.
For illustration it was advised: "A dangerous or defective
condition, as denoted by the use of that term in these instructions means a condition in the sidewalk in question that would
have caused it to be not reasonably safe for persons who, with
ordinary care for their own safety, used said sidewalk, or
might have used it for the purpose intended, or as expressly or
impliedly invited, or as permitted by the controlling authority.
"A mtmicipality is not bound to maintain its sidewalks in
a condition to preclude the possibility of accident. It i,s not
an insurer of the safety of the users of public sidewalks. The
duty imposed by law upon the City is to exercise ordinary care
to maintain its public sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition
for their use in a proper manne~. The City has the same right
as all individual to assume that in using the sidewalk the public
will use ordinary care and caution.
"A duty is imposed upon officers of a municipality, whose
business requires them to inspect and repair sidewalks to exercise due care to discover defects which may be reasonably anticipated." It was given the general standard and it is not to be
supposed that it adopted the "¥.& inch hole" rule referred to
in the stipUlation.
As before stated, the record discloses that no objection was
made by counsel for defendant to the facts stated in the stipulation. At no time did he state that he had not agreed or did
not agree to stipulate to all of the facts contained in the stipulation as dictated by the trial judge to the reporter and read
by the reporter to the jury. A reading of the objections and
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was that it did not constitute competent evidence of defendant's negligence because the instructions, rules or practice of
the city with regard to the repair of defects in streets of over
one-half inch in depth was not competent evidence that a hole
of that depth (''!'eated a dangerous and defective condition
which would render the city liable to anyone injured thereby.
Counsel's position is made unquestionably clear in the following statements made at the time the stipulation was introduced
in evidence: "Ma. HAYES: W eU, I had better restate my
position at this time. First, that the contents of the proposed
stipulation with reference to the repairs of the damages as to
sidewalks, are merely instructions to workmen, giving them
some idea as to what types of holes, what to look for to indi. cate if sidewalks are beginning to deteriorate. They are not
~. a set of rules or standards. Second, that the superintendent
of streets has no authority to adopt a set of rules which would
give, as a standard for any imposition or determination of
the liability of the City, what holes mayor may not be dangerous or defective. Third, that the City of Long Beach has the
right to give instructions to its men to take preventive measures
for the repair of its sidewalks which may be, or at a later datl~
~ become, defective without determining that the hole constitutes dangerous or defective conditions or that there is anything about the hole at the time that the repair is made that
it is a dangerous or defective condition.
.
"May I mix argument with objections' On the further
ground it is incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial and does
.. not tend to prove any of the issues in this case. It doesn't
tend to prove this particular spot or any other particular spot
in the City of Long Beach was in a dangerous or defective
condition, calls for a conclusion on the part of Mr. Kincaid or
the parties who make the repairs. That states my position as
well as the objections." In view of the foregoing there is
clearly no justification for the st.atements in the majority
opinion to the effect that counsel for defendant did not agree
to the facts stated in the stipulation and that the burden was
on the plaintiff to prove counsel's assent to such facts before
the stipulation was introduced in. evidence. Of course, it is
obvious that there could be no stipulation of facts unless counsel for both sides assented thereto, and the discussion in. the
majority opinion in regard to the stipulation is talk .about
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IIfllll('thill~ whi('h did not. fOxist if the gfnt.·rnl.'nts iu flll' majority
opinion art' I~orre(!t.
It was cert;tinly incumbent upon counsf!l for the defendant
to in some manncr make known to the 1'0u~ and counsel for
plaintiff that he did llot agree to the truth of the facts stated
by the COllrt in the stipulation if any of t.hose facts were not
in accord with the truth, or at least in accord with what Kin('aid would have testified to had be been called as a wit.nl'ss.
I repeat again that at no time· did (!ollnsel for defendant assert
that any of the facts contained in the stipulation ,vere untrne
or that be did not agree to stipulate that if Kincaid wer'}
called as a witness he would testify to all of Mid facts.
In view of the situation as above narrated, there can bc no
question but tliat the stipUlation as read by the trial judge
to the reporter and reread by the reporter to the jury was
agreed to by counsel for defendant, and in view of the rules
of law which I have heretofore stated herein, thl're can be no
question but that the IItipulation wes aomi'lSible in evidencfll.
Since the only ground stated in the· majority opinion for
the reversal of the judgment is that the court committed error
in submitting to the jury a stipnlation containing facts which
were not agreed to by counsel for defendant, and since this
ground finds DO legal or factual basis in the record before us,
the conclusion reached in the majority opinion is unsound.
It must necessarily follow that the judgment should be
affirmed.

Schauer, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied Decemher 23, 1948. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a re. hearing~

